Notwithstanding the abundant literature on the subject, the principle of EU autonomy vis-à-vis international law is not yet clear. The contribution that this book aims to offer to the current legal debate is a systematic picture of the principle of EU autonomy by tackling three intertwined questions: What is the principle of autonomy in EU external relations law? How is it safeguarded? Why is it necessary?
This book will prove that the principle of autonomy is a structural principle in the sense that the CJEU aims at protecting the “existential” legal features of the EU legal order from external threats. These encompass those structural (or federal) characteristics of the EU and EU law that the Court defines as “essential” and its “very foundations”, such as the principles of unity, uniformity and consistency of EU law, conferral, and mutual trust.
Understanding the principle of autonomy also entails explaining how the Union protects (or should protect) the structural dimension of the EU legal order.
The principle of autonomy enhances the debate on ad hoc solutions – such as disconnection clauses, referral to the CJEU, and rules of proceduralization – to accommodate, when possible, the legal features of the EU vis-à-vis other international legal orders.
Furthermore, it will be investigated why the CJEU needs to protect “essential” and “very foundations” aspects of EU law and the EU. That is, one may argue that a constitutionalist reading of autonomy justifies the existence of this principle, however, does the CJEU pursue a further purpose in shaping the relationship between the EU and international law? Does it envisage autarky rather than pluralism? Is the balance between openness towards international law and protection of substantive EU law properly struck?
